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The decline of science in corporate R&D
Research summary: In this paper, we document a shift away from science by large corporations
between 1980 and 2006. We nd that publications by company scientists have declined over time
in a range of industries. We also nd that the value attributable to scientic research has dropped,
whereas the value attributable to technical knowledge (as measured by patents) has remained stable.
These trends are unlikely to be driven principally by changes in publication practices. Further
science continues to be useful as an input into innovation. Our evidence points to a reduction of the
private benets of internal research. Large rms still value the golden eggs of science (as reected
in patents) but seem to be increasingly unwilling to invest in the golden goose itself (the internal
scientic capabilities).
Managerial summary: There is a widespread belief among commentators that large Ameri-
can corporations are withdrawing from research. Large corporations may still collaborate with
universities and acquire promising science-based start-ups, but their labs increasingly focus on de-
veloping existing knowledge and commercializing it, rather than creating new knowledge. In this
paper, we combine rm-level nancial information with a large and comprehensive dataset on rm
publications, patents and acquisitions to quantify the withdrawal from science by large American
corporations between 1980 and 2006. This withdrawal is associated with a decline in the private
value of research activities, even though scientic knowledge itself remains important for corporate
invention. We discuss the managerial and policy implications of our ndings.
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1 Introduction
During the 20th century and especially the post-war period, the U.S. created a scientic-industrial
complex that greatly contributed to scientic progress and resulted in many important innovations.
A key component of this scientic-industrial complex was the large corporate lab in corporations
such as AT&T, Du Pont, IBM and Xerox. Research from such labs has led to many important
discoveries such as the transistor, the laser, and the rst computer with a graphical user interface,
as well as breakthroughs in medicine and pharmacology.
Since the 1980s, however, the U.S. scientic-industrial complex has undergone profound trans-
formations (Mowery, 1995, 2009; Hounshell, 1996; Pisano, 2010). A key transformation has been
the redirection, by many leading rms, of resources and attention from more exploratory scientic
research toward more commercially-oriented projects. But though articles in the popular press do
lament the demise of top-ight corporate labs (e.g., Economist, 2007), researchers have yet to doc-
ument the breadth and depth of this transformation, or whether this decline in `corporate science'
is related to a decline in the economic value of research, and if so, whether it is private or social
economic value.1
In this paper, we take a step toward lling these gaps. A fuller understanding of the nature
and extent of this withdrawal is a rst step towards understanding the possible reasons, such
as the growth of technology markets (Arora et al., 2001; Chesbrough, 2003; Arora et al., 2016),
globalization (Bloom et al. 2016; Autor et al. 2016), and managerial short-termism (e.g., Marginson
and McAulay, 2008). Our ndings are likely to be relevant to managers and scientic entrepreneurs,
who operate within and must understand the evolution of their ecosystem (e.g., Pisano, 2010), and
to policymakers, who might wish to inuence it.
Our primary contribution is to establish a set of important facts about the changing nature
of corporate R&D over a quarter of a century. To do so, we develop publication-based indicators
of scientic research at the rm level. We link scientic publications in \hard science" journals
(including engineering science) from the Web of Science to publicly traded rms in the United
States, using the aliations of the authors. Our primary rm sample consists of 4,068 publicly listed,
R&D-performing companies with at least one patent over the period 1980{2006. Collectively, these
rms account for 452,297 \rm publications"|scientic articles where at least one of the authors
1For simplicity, we use the terms \science" and \research" (or \scientic research") interchangeably. The key
distinction we make is between \research" (as measured by publications in scientic journals) and \development" (as
measured by patents). We largely avoid ner distinctions such as that between basic and applied research because
these distinctions are often dicult to draw in practice.
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is a company employee.
We nd that, over the period 1980{2006 participation in scientic research by publicly traded
American companies diminished. A signicant fraction of the decline can be attributed to entry by
rms that do not publish or publish very little. However rms with established research programs
also markedly decreased research. In terms of the nature of research, the decline is most evident in
high-quality publications. The implied value of scientic capability, as measured by stock market
valuations or by the acquisition price in M&A deals, also declined. By contrast, patenting by large
American rms increased and the implied value of patents, including the premium paid for patents
in M&A, did not decrease. We nd no evidence that invention became less science-intensive, or
that the science used in inventions grew older. These patterns are present across a broad range of
industries, except perhaps biotechnology.
As mentioned above, we are not the rst to note the decline of many large corporate labs, or docu-
ment that corporate scientists are publishing less (e.g., Coombs and Georghiou, 2002; Bhaskarbhatla
and Hegde, 2013). Tijssen (2004), for instance, shows that the total number of papers published by
corporate researchers in academic journals substantially declined over the period 1996-2001. Data
from the National Science Foundation (NSF) also indicates that the share of basic and applied
research in corporate R&D in the United States declined from 28 percent in 1985 to 21 percent in
2009.2 However, a limitation of both Tijssen's paper and the NSF statistics is that they present
aggregate patterns. Thus, it is dicult to assess whether the trends they document reect changes
in the behavior of existing rms or other factors, such as a change in the industrial mix of reporting
rms or the entry of innovative rms that do not engage in research.3
The rst contribution of this paper is to distinguish between these eects, and quantify them. A
second key contribution is to jointly analyze changes in both the value and the quantum of scientic
outputs. By matching rm publications with stock market data as well as M&A data, we are able
to estimate the implied \value" of scientic capability. Previous work has argued that capabilities
in research are plausible sources of competitive advantage (e.g., Gambardella, 1992, 1995; Durand
et al., 2008). Griliches (1986) analyzed the drivers of productivity and prots for a sample of the
1,000 largest manufacturing rms in the U.S. For the period 1967{1977, he found that the share
of basic research in the rm's R&D expenditure was positively related to measures of productivity
growth. Henderson and Cockburn (1994) showed that bundles of organizational practices capturing
2See NSF Science & Engineering Indicators 2016, Appendix Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5.
3A second issue with NSF data is that distinguishing between research and development requires subjective judg-
ments. Such judgments may not be fully reliable or consistent over time.
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pharmaceutical rms' propensity to connect with the external scientic community were strongly
associated with success in drug discovery. Our results qualify these important early ndings, as we
show that for large rms in broad range of industries, the value attached to engaging in scientic
research has declined over the last quarter of a century.
By estimating the implied value of scientic capability, we also probe the proximate causes of
the decline of science in corporate R&D. Large rms may be producing fewer scientic publications
because (i) the private value of investments in internal (in-house) scientic research has declined,
or (ii) its cost has increased. A third possibility is that rms have not reduced their investments in
science: what has changed is their propensity to publish their research results in academic journals.
We refer to this possibility as (iii) a change in publication practices. Though we cannot denitively
rule out any of these possibilities, we argue that our ndings, as well as aggregate NSF data, can
most easily be reconciled with a reduction in the net future benets from internal scientic research.
To summarize, our contribution is to go beyond case studies and aggregate data to document
the extent to which corporate engagement in research has changed over time, within and across
rms. Our ndings suggest that, in reducing their engagement in science (as measured by rm
publications), rms have been following market signals. Large rms are publishing less in scientic
journals because these activities are now less privately valuable than they once were, as indicated
by the collective judgement of investors and managers. This does not mean that research is not
socially benecial. Our evidence that invention is not becoming less science-intensive, or that the
vintage of science used in inventions is not growing older, further suggests that the social value of
science is not declining. We discuss, but do not empirically analyze, a variety of factors that might
account for why the private value of science, for established rms, has diverged from the social value
of science. In concluding the paper, we also discuss the implications of this reduction in corporate
science for managers, as well as public policy.
2 Conceptual background
There is an extensive literature in strategy on corporate engagement in scientic research. Although
many innovations arise through serendipity or through knowledge generated outside formal R&D,
corporations have also invested in science to accelerate the introduction of new products and pro-
cesses. Innovations sometimes build directly on scientic advance (e.g., new drugs), and sometimes
arise as indirect outputs of scientic research (e.g., laser). In other cases, scientic research en-
hances the productivity of technical search by guiding it toward more fruitful pastures (Evenson
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and Kislev, 1976; Gambardella, 1995; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). Investments in scientic re-
search also help rms absorb outside technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Gambardella, 1992).
Company scientists can help identify promising new inventions, engage with the relevant outside
researchers, and help assimilate and adapt outside technology. Publishing in academic journals and
attending conferences, in particular, may be the most eective way to remain \plugged in" to the
external scientic network (Rosenberg, 1990; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998).4
2.1 Evolution of U.S. corporate research
Corporate engagement in science began modestly. The leading American rms of the 1870s and
1880s, such as the railroad companies and Western Union, mostly relied on external inventions.
They established industrial labs to evaluate the quality of these external inventions and other inputs
(Hounshell, 1996; Mowery, 1995; Carlson, 2013). Growing competition, anti-trust pressures, and
the increasing output of university-trained PhDs led companies such as GE and DuPont to invest
in internal research to generate new products and processes (Reich, 1985; Hounshell and Smith,
1986). The process gained momentum during the inter-war years, as corporations grew larger and
more anxious to control and \routinize" innovation. Landmark discoveries (e.g., vacuum tubes,
radio, synthetic rubber, nylon), the growing practical applicability of recently discovered scientic
principles, and the rapid increase in government funding in the United States led to more companies
investing in internal research after World War II.
But corporate research did not always deliver satisfactory returns to shareholders. Discoveries
such as nylon and the transistor were few and far between. And even when fundamental advances in
science or technology were made, the sponsoring rms sometimes failed to prot from these advances,
especially when the industries aected were unrelated to the sponsoring rm's core business. The
graphical user interface, for instance, was invented in Xerox's PARC, but other rms, most notably
Apple and Microsoft, reaped the rewards. By the 1980s, rms began to look to universities and
small start-ups as sources of ideas and new products, using a mix of contracts, licenses, alliances,
and outright acquisitions. Many corporate labs were closed, downsized, or redirected toward more
commercial applications (Pisano, 2010).
NSF data indicate that rms with more than 10,000 employees accounted for 73 percent of non-
4Engaging in scientic activities also enhances the reputation of the rm and certies the quality of its research
to prospective investors, employees, government agencies, and sophisticated customers (Hicks, 1995; Audretsch and
Stephan, 1996). Clinical studies, for instance, are routinely used by rms in the pharmaceutical industry to advertise
the eectiveness of their drugs to doctors and hospitals (Azoulay, 2002). Also, to the extent that allowing employees
to publish helps rms recruit more talented researchers, participating in the process of advancing science can be a
protable strategy for some rms (Stern, 2004; Roach and Sauermann, 2010).
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federally funded R&D in 1985. By 1998, this share had dropped to 54 percent, and to 51 percent by
2008 (Mowery, 2009). A dierent indicator of the decline in the relative importance of large rms
is the sharp drop in share of large rms in the R&D 100 awards winners: whereas 41 percent of the
awards went to Fortune 500 rms in 1971, only 6 percent went to Fortune 500 rms in 2006 (Block
and Keller, 2009). Several factors contributed to the growing importance of small rms in R&D.
Encouraged by the 1980 Bayh-Dole act, universities began to patent and license actively, supplying
inventions to both big rms and startups. University scientists found increasingly attractive to start
their own businesses, whose high-powered incentives and nimble ways are dicult to replicate in
large, established rms encumbered by bureaucracy (Christensen and Bower, 1996). Changes in the
institutional and legal environment have complemented these trends. Start-ups can get nancing
from venture capitalists and SBIR and other government programs (Kortum and Lerner, 2000;
Mazzucato, 2013). Intellectual property rights have been signicantly strengthened starting from
the early 1980s, rst in the U.S. and subsequently in other countries (Jae and Lerner, 2004; Guellec
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007).
These trends are consistent with a division of labor in which universities specialize in research,
small start-ups convert promising new ndings into inventions and larger, more established, rms
specialize in product development and commercialization (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). In this
view, smaller rms have a comparative advantage in generating inventions whereas larger rms
have an advantage in exploiting them. Large rms may invest in scientic capability to be eective
buyers of knowledge.
3 Changing value of engaging in science: A taxonomy
We follow Griliches (1981) and Hall (1993) in linking market value to research but use citation-
weighted publication stock, consistent with Gambardella (1992) and Cockburn and Henderson
(1998). Hall et al. (2005) use a market-value approach to measure the return to R&D invest-
ment for U.S. rms in the 1980s but do not distinguish between research and development. The
literature also reports a positive relationship between the market valuation of rms and the science
intensity of their patents (Deng et al., 1999) or their stocks of scientic publications (Simeth and
Cincera, 2015).
These studies do not examine how the value of engaging in science has changed over time, or
why. In this paper, we propose a parsimonious taxonomy to classify forces that may have aected
the decision of large rms to withdraw from science, as measured by their propensity to publish
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in academic journals. A rm may publish less in academic journals because it has invested less in
scientic research in the recent past or because it has become more reluctant to publish, for given
research investments (a change in publication practices). Lower investments in research may result
from a drop in the private benets associated with research, or an increase in the private costs. Each
of these outcomes has several possible drivers, which we discuss below. Our list is not exhaustive
but does include most of the factors mentioned by academics and practitioners.
1. The private benets of internal research have declined. There are a number of reasons
why the benets of investing in science internally may have declined in the past several years.
A. Science is becoming less useful to invention. Popular discussions sometime suggest that
innovation has become less science-intensive. For instance, it is sometimes claimed that certain types
of innovation (e.g., business methods, design innovations) or innovation in IT intensive industries
largely do not build on scientic advances. As The Economist (2007) asserts: \One reason for the
shift towards more commercially minded research in technology companies is that the nature of IT
has changed so much. In [Vannevar] Bush's time the science that went into computing was itself
closer to basic research. By contrast, many of the big scientic questions in computing have been
answered|at least well enough for companies to nd that innovation emerges from new ways of
arranging today's technologies rather than inventing new ones. Dell's innovation was a business
model that used extreme supply-chain eciency to create bespoke computers. Likewise, Apple's
iPod is a new interface atop standard industry parts". If true, this would imply that science has
become socially less valuable, and overall investment in research should be lower. However, the
idea that advances in information technology are not rooted in science is open to question. Not
only do robotics, machine learning and articial intelligence build upon statistics, computer science,
electrical engineering, and material science, but advances in these technologies are also predicated
upon advances in the underlying science, including engineering science.
B. Growth of technology markets. Even assuming that science has remained useful to invention,
internal investments in research may have become less valuable because it is now easier than ever
to tap into external sources of knowledge and invention. As discussed above, universities and small
rms are now a more important source of inventions, and a thickening of that side of the market
is likely to have reduced both the transaction cost of nding a suitable partner, and the monetary
cost to be paid by a large rm for an externally sourced invention.
Several factors are likely to have further contributed to the growth of technology markets.
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Technology cycles are shortening, and it may be quicker, as well as less expensive, to rely on external
capabilities. Greater protection of intellectual property rights has reduced the risk of expropriation
in technology transactions. Developments in IT have rendered contracting for innovation easier and
less expensive. The diusion of online platforms (e.g., P&G's Connect + Develop) and the growth
of technology market intermediaries (e.g., yet2.com Marketplace, InnoCentive), for instance, are
likely to have reduced transaction costs. Finally, managers may have become increasingly aware of
the diculties of managing research in large rms (Hounshell and Smith, 1986; Kay, 1988; Argyres
and Silverman, 2004, Arora et al., 2014).
On the supply side, as already noted, universities are actively licensing their technologies, and
nimble startups oer incumbents additional opportunities to acquire inventions instead of relying
solely on internal research. This is consistent with the a growing division of innovative labor among
established rms, start-ups, and universities (Jewkes et al., 1969; Arora et al., 2001). In a survey
of over 6,000 manufacturing- and service-sector rms in the U.S., Arora et al. (2016) nd that 49
percent of the innovating rms between 2007 and 2009 reported that their most important new
product originated from an external source. Given that substitution of internal research inside
large rms with externally sourced inventions is now arguably less costly, managers may nd it
increasingly hard to justify signicant investments in science before investors.
C. Growing appropriability problems: narrowing rm scope and increasing competition
and globalization. Because scientic results are dicult to protect through patents or other legal
mechanisms, appropriability problems are particularly salient for research. In addition to a more
rapid dissemination of scientic discoveries, two other trends may have contributed to exacerbate
these problems: a decline in diversication at the rm level, and increased product market compe-
tition. Specialized rms are believed to have lower incentives to invest in scientic research because
their narrower scope may impair their ability to recognize and exploit the commercial value of re-
search results. In part, this originates from a natural tendency of both individuals and organizations
to search locally (March and Simon, 1958; Stuart and Podolny, 1996). Firms are most likely to
recognize and invest in opportunities that are related to their existing operations (Leonard-Barton,
1992; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Chesbrough, 2002). By contrast, diversied rms may be the ones
best positioned to exploit the unpredictable outcomes of scientic research because, as Nelson (1959:
302) notes, \[a] broad technological base insures that, whatever direction the path of research may
take, the results are likely to be of value to the sponsoring rm". Thus, as rms concentrate on
their core markets, their private incentives to invest in scientic research may decline.
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Appropriability problems may have also become more serious because of increased product
market competition. Theoretically, greater competition has ambiguous eects on the propensity
of leading rms to develop innovations internally. On the one hand, competition drives price-
cost margins down and thus discourages investments in R&D, but on the other hand, successful
innovation may be the only way to \escape" competition and low price-cost margins (Aghion et al.,
2005). Empirical work on the topic, while extensive, has been largely inconclusive (see Cohen, 2010,
for a survey). Bloom et al. (2016) use a panel of up to half a million rms over 1996-2007 across
twelve European countries, and nd that Chinese import competition led to increases in patenting,
TFP, IT intensity and R&D expenditures. Autor et al. (2016) reach the opposite conclusion.
Using a sample of publicly listed U.S. manufacturing rms between 1975 and 2007, they nd that
rms more exposed to Chinese import penetration patent less. Both these papers focus on patents,
which are more representative of innovation rather than scientic research, and also provide some
protection from competition.
D. Increasing short-termism. Short-termism can be dened as a preference for actions that
secure short-term benets to the detriment of long-term results (Marginson and McAulay, 2008).
Short-termism on the part of managers is often blamed on pressures by equity markets|in particu-
lar, investors' excessive focus on quarterly earnings and short-term stock price. While the evidence
on this point is hardly conclusive (see, e.g., Woolridge and Snow, 1990), estimates suggest that
only about 10 percent of institutional investors care about long-term performance and are informed
about any individual company's fundamental long-term value (Bushee, 2004).5 Recent advances
in information technology, such as higher frequency stock trading, may have intensied pressures
from these \transient" investors (Bolton and Samama, 2013). Increasing M&A activity may further
exacerbate pressures on managers to deliver immediate results (Burgelman and McKinney, 2006;
Valentini, 2012). As a result, some managers may cut research budgets to meet quarterly prot
targets.
2. The private costs of internal research have increased. Reduced investments in internal
scientic research may be driven not only by a reduction in benets, but also by an increase in
costs. We consider two possible sources of increasing costs.
A. Increase in salaries and equipment cost. The private costs of internal research relate to
5In 1960, the annual share turnover for rms listed in NYSE was 12 percent. By 1987, it had risen to 73 percent
(Bratton, 2007). By 2010, the annual share turnover for rms listed in U.S. exchanges had reached 300 percent (Strine,
2010), implying an average holding period of just four months.
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the costs that rms must incur to set up and run their research facilities. A large component of
these costs are the salaries that must be paid to corporate scientists and engineers. There is little
evidence that PhDs' wages have increased in relative terms in the last few decades. Stephan (2012,
Figure 7.2) compares the mean earnings of PhDs in engineering, physical sciences, and life sciences
to the mean earnings of terminal baccalaureate recipients (the \average" educated person) between
1973 and 2006. With some variation, the PhD premium has remained relatively stable, at around
50 percent in engineering and 30 percent in the life sciences. However, because we cannot rule out
that other costs have increased, we include changes in the private costs of internal research as a
potential explanation for why rms' propensity to engage in science appears to be declining.
B. Decrease in scientic productivity of internal research. Another possibility is that
internal research is less productive in terms of producing scientic output. This requires us to
distinguish between research eort, scientic capability (as measured by publications), and inven-
tions (as measured by patents). Over time, more research eort may be necessary to produce one
unit of scientic output if producing scientic breakthroughs (or \climbing over the shoulders of
giants" ) is getting harder. Note that a decrease in the scientic productivity of internal research is
economically equivalent to an increase in the cost of producing publications. On the other hand, if
innovation becomes less science based, then scientic eort is less relevant for producing inventions
over time, implying a reduction in the benet of investing in research.
3. Changes in publication practices. A rm may publish less in academic journals not because
it is investing less in research, but because it has become more reluctant to publish. The decision
to publish hinges on a balance between various costs and benets. Benets of disclosing R&D
results to the broader scientic community include: (i) strengthening ties with external researchers
and institutions, (ii) reputational advantages and certication before various external stakeholders
(investors, government, potential customers and partners), and (iii) potential benets from providing
a perk to internal scientists. The cost of disclosing research is chiey that of detrimental spillovers
to rivals.
The strengthening of intellectual property rights that started from the 1980s may have tilted
the balance of costs and benets. Publishing results too early might compromise a rm's ability
to patent some of these results later. It may also enable rivals to patent some follow-on results.
Potentially osetting eects are also possible. Frequently rms embed the same piece of knowledge
in both a patent and a paper|a patent-publication pair. Stronger intellectual property rights may
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then increase rms' incentives to publish because, through the associated patent, the risk of giving
away knowledge is reduced. Thus, publication and patents may be complements, not substitutes
(Gans et al., 2013).
If incentives within a corporation become more closely tied to patenting outputs, researchers will
start devoting more time and eort to that activity, to the detriment of writing academic papers and
publishing. Bhaskarbhatla and Hegde's (2013) study of changes in IP management practices at IBM
is consistent with these ideas. In 1989, the reward system for scientists at IBM changed. Scientists
had to earn 25{50 percent of their \points" through patents. This resulted in a large increase in
patenting and a marked decline in \technical disclosures" by IBM, which contained incremental
research ndings not likely to be of great scientic signicance. This suggests that, if greater
emphasis on patenting is driving the decline in corporate publications, the type of publications
most likely to be aected will be the ones closer to the applied research end of the spectrum.6
3.1 Implications for the quantity and market value of scientic outputs
Table 1 summarizes how the forces discussed above are likely to have changed rms' propensity
to publish in academic journals and the market value associated with existing scientic capability
(as proxied by a rm's publication stock). All these factors could lead to a drop in publications
over time. They have, however, dierent implications for the market value of existing scientic
capability.
In Appendix A, we formally show that a decrease in the benets of research and an increase
in its costs have opposite eects on the market value associated with existing scientic capability.
A reduction in private benets makes all internal research less valuable, and hence the value of
existing internal scientic capability also drops in value. By contrast, an increase in the cost of
internal research would reduce the propensity of rms to produce new scientic research, but that
would raise the value of its substitute|the existing (and opportunely discounted) internal knowledge
stock. Put dierently, the more expensive it is to produce new science, the more valuable it is to
already have a signicant knowledge stock in-house.
It is conceivable that increases in disclosure costs imply a reduction in the value of the stock
of publications, for instance, if investors see publication evidence of mismanagement. However, in
line with our previous discussion, a greater cost of disclosure may increase the market value of
the existing publication stock, because building a reputation for scientic capability becomes more
6During this time, IBM also changed research focus, requiring research units to become more commercially oriented.
Consistent with this, the annual number of IBM publications in scientic journals also declined.
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costly, and the value of already having such a reputation is therefore higher.
[Insert Table 1 here]
4 Data and results
We combine data from four main sources: (i) U.S. Compustat, (ii) M&A data from Thomson SDC
Platinum, (iii) scientic publications from the Web of Science (previously known as ISI Web of
Knowledge), and (iv) patent data from PatStat and the NBER 2006 patent data project. Our
principal results pertain to publicly traded rms in the United States. We provide additional
evidence using a large sample of M&A deals. The latter sample is described in more detail later
along with the corresponding empirical results.
Our principal sample consists of all rms from the U.S. annual Compustat database with pos-
itive R&D expenditures and at least one patent for at least one year between 1980 and 2006. To
better capture the complexity of large rms' innovative activities, which can be highly decentral-
ized across subsidiaries, we construct the dataset at the ultimate-owner (UO)-parent-company level.
Importantly, while the econometric analysis is performed at this level, the matching of patents and
publications is done at the subsidiary level. For example, if a rm's subsidiary publishes scientic
articles while the parent company is the assignee registered on the rm's patents, we capture both
at the UO level.
The construction of the dataset presents several challenges. For instance, a parent company
and a subsidiary may have dierent identication numbers and records within the Compustat data.
Furthermore, a single company may correspond to multiple rm identiers within the Compustat
database due to changes in ownership structure and accounting changes over the sample period.
We describe in detail the procedures we use to deal with these challenges in Appendix B.
These procedures leave us with 4,608 UO companies, which comprise our main sample of publicly
traded companies in the United States. These rms have positive R&D expenditures, at least one
patent, and four consecutive years of data within Compustat, over the period 1980{2006. Our
econometric analysis consists of an unbalanced panel 62,474 rm-year observations.
To capture a rm's participation in scientic research, we match our sample rms to the Web of
Science database (previously known as ISI Web of Knowledge). We include articles from journals
covered in the \Science Citation Index" and \Conference Proceedings Citation Index - Science",
which exclude social sciences, arts and humanities articles. Using the aliation eld for each
publications record, we identify 452,297 articles, published between 1980 and 2006, with at least
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one author employed by our sample of Compustat rms. We also match our sample rms to the
patent datasets. Details on publication and patent matching are provided in Appendix B.
Using rm-level information on R&D expenditures, publications and patents, we construct the
corresponding stock measures. R&D stock is calculated using a perpetual inventory method with
a 15 percent depreciation rate (Hall et al., 2005). So the R&D stock, GRD, in year t is GRDt =
Rt + (1  )GRDt 1 where Rt is the R&D expenditure in year t and  = 0:15. Publication stock in
year t is Publication stockt = Pubt+(1 )Publication stockt 1 where Pubt is the citation-weighted
number of publications in year t. Citation weights are constructed as the ratio between the number
of citations an article receives and the average number of citations received by all articles published
in the same year.7 Patent stock is computed in a similar way using citation-weighted patent data.
Yearly observations with missing values are set to zero.
Following Griliches (1986), market value is dened as the sum of the values of common stock,
preferred stock, and total debt net of current assets. The book value of capital includes net plant,
property and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles
other than R&D. Table A1 in the online appendix lists the key variables used in this study, with
the corresponding descriptions and data sources.
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics for our main sample rms. The mean market value
of rms in our sample is $2 billion. Mean R&D spending is $69 million and the mean stocks of
scientic publications and patents are 149 and 188, respectively. 2,535 rms (55% of our sample
rms) publish a scientic article at least once during the sample period. Table A2 in the online
appendix presents mean comparison tests for publishing versus non-publishing rms. Publishing
rms are larger, have higher market value, and invest more in R&D than non-publishing rms.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Figures 1{2 plot how average annual publications and patents by the rms in our sample have
changed over time. Later in the econometric analysis we present the within-rm analyses that
account for changes in sample composition. Figure 1 shows that the average number of publications
by publishing rms has dropped over time by approximately 60 percent. By contrast, the average
number of patents has increased over time by about 100 percent. Figure 2 plots the average number
of publications per year by industry. The same pattern of declining rm publications is evident
across a wide range of industries. Section 4.1.3 shows that this pattern is robust to controlling for
changes in sample composition over time.
7All our results hold whether or not we weight publications by citations.
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[Insert Figures 1{2 here]
4.1 Econometric results
4.1.1 Number of publications over time
We begin our analysis by examining how the number of publications produced by rms has changed
over time. Table 3 presents the estimation results. The general pattern of results conrms that
publications have fallen over time. Column 1 presents the results from a within-industry specica-
tion. The coecient estimate on time trend is negative and statistically dierent from zero. This
estimate implies that publications per year fell by 20 percent per decade, or by 52 percent over
the complete estimation period.8 This fall is similar to that observed in Figure 1. Evaluated at
the sample mean of 7 publications per year, the results imply that each rm published 0.14 fewer
articles per year, assuming constant drop. Note however that rms who do not publish at all will
register no decline. Column 2 restricts the sample to rms with at least one publication over the
estimation period. As expected, the trend is more negative for publishing rms indicating a fall
of close to 40 percent per decade, or about 0.6 fewer articles per year. In cumulative terms, and
evaluated at the sample mean of 15 publications per year, this means that publishing rms, instead
of producing 150 publications per decade, only produce 127. Aggregated over all rms, the implied
reduction in scientic output becomes substantial.
The fall in publications over time can be the result of changes in sample composition, for
instance, the entry of less research intensive rms entering the sample rather than a reduction in
publications by existing research rms. To eliminate sample composition eects we turn to within-
rm specications. As shown in column 3, the coecient estimate on trend is much smaller in
absolute value when controlling for rm xed eects, indicating that a considerable part of the drop
in publications over time from columns 1 and 2 is due to entry of less research-intensive rms. The
estimate from column 3 implies that publications fell (within-rms) by about 20 percent per decade.
This estimate is the average for all publishing rms in the sample, including new entrants for which
within-rm variation might be limited. Column 4 includes only rms with at least one publication
during the early sample period of 1980-1985 and also includes rm xed eects. The coecient
estimate on time trend rises in absolute value to -0.25, implying a reduction in the annual number
of publications of about 25 per cent over the decade. The mean number of publications per year for
established rms is 19. Thus, our ndings imply that established rms published on average about
8The time trend is divided by 10 for all specications (i.e., presented in decennial units).
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0.5 fewer articles per year, a drop in annual number of publications from about 19 to about 14 ten
years later. In cumulative terms, instead of producing 190 publications per decade, these rms only
produce 167.9
Columns 5-10 present the estimation results for the eect of trend by publication quality. We use
two measures of publication quality: the impact factor of the journal where the article is published,
and the number of scientic citations an article receives. The results show that the decline over
time is largely due to a decline in high quality publications rather than publications in general.
Columns 5-7 distinguish between high and low impact factor journals. In column 5 we include only
publications in journals that fall into the bottom quartile of the journal impact factor distribution
of the sample of rm publications. The coecient estimate on trend is negative, but statistically
indistinguishable from zero (an estimate of -0.02 with a standard error of 0.02). Column 6, including
only publications in the top quartile of journal impact factor distribution, shows a large negative
coecient estimate on trend (an estimate of -0.32 with a standard error of 0.03), implying a 32
percent reduction in rm publications per year over the sample period. Restricting the sample to
rms with established research programs (rms with at least one publication during the period
1980-1985) yields a decline of 35 percent by these rms in journals in the top quartile. Columns
8-10 use the number of scientic citations received by the publication, normalized by the mean
number of citations received by all publications published in the same year as the focal publication,
as a measure of quality. We distinguish between articles in the top quartile of all publications
appearing in the same year (not just those by corporate scientists) and in the bottom quartile
of all publications. The same pattern of results holds with this measure as well: the number of
publications per year in the lowest quartile remained stable over time, yet highly cited publications
declined by over a third over the sample period. Column 10 shows that the decline in highly cited
publications is more marked in rms with established research programs.10
In summary, we nd evidence consistent with a decline in corporate participation in research.
9The decline is especially pronounced for very large established rms. For instance, IBM publications steadily
increased from 594 in 1981 to a peak of 1212 in 1992, and then fell steadily to 602 in 2006. Over the same period, its
patenting increased from 384 in 1980 to 853 in 1992 to 3626 in 2006. The average annual decline for IBM from its
peak is about 44 publications per year, while patenting increased by about 200 per year.
10We nd that European rms have experienced a similar decline in publication activity. We match publication and
patent records to all European rms from Amadeus (private and public rms). Lacking data on R&D expenditures,
we restrict attention to rms that either patent or publish at least once during the sample period 1997{2007, for which
nancial data are available. We identify about 58,000 publications by 3,642 rms and 210,000 patents by 10,053 rms.
Table A3 presents the estimation results for within-rm changes in number of publications and patents. We observe
a very similar pattern of results in the European sample. Publications decline over time after controlling for rm
sales, at about the same rate for public and private rms (column 3). The rate of decline is similar when we restrict
attention to rms that are present in the sample for longer than 10 years (column 4), and it is even greater when we
focus only on rms that started publishing prior to 1980 (column 5).
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This decline cannot be explained solely by the entry of new types of rms that are less science-
intensive, though the latter is undoubtedly an important part of the explanation. Rather, the
decline is present even in analyses that control for rm xed eects. Further, the decline is more
marked when we focus on rms with established research programs. Finally, consistent with the
idea that corporations are shifting their focus from research to development, we nd that the decline
is largely conned to high quality publications.
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.1.2 Market value of publication stock over time
Changes in publication output could reect either a reduction in the private benets of internal
research or an increase in its private marginal cost (or both). In the online appendix we provide a
simple model which shows that an increase in marginal cost would reduce the quantity of research
but increase the market value of the stock of research. By contrast, a decline in the private benets of
science will reduce both the quantity of research and the market value of the stock of research. Here,
we empirically examine how the market value of the publication and patent stocks has changed over
time.11 Specically, we estimate a version of the well known Tobin Q equation, where we regress the
log of market value on stocks of assets, including R&D, patents, as well as publications (Griliches,
1981). The coecient estimates from a Tobin Q type regression can be thought of as a \shadow
price" of the corresponding tangible or intangible asset, under the assumption that a rm maximizes
expected future prots but the assets cannot be adjusted costlessly. Using a log-log specication,
as we do, implies that the coecient estimates are elasticities. Each coecient estimate can also
be interpreted as the share of the value of the rm attributable to the corresponding asset (see Hall
1993 for details).
The results in Table 3 point to the importance of controlling for variation across rms. Accord-
ingly, we focus on within-rm variation. Table 4 presents within-rm estimates where the dependent
variable is the natural log of stock market value. To learn about how the value of scientic capability
has changed over time, we include an interaction term between time trend and the natural log of
publication stock. To ensure the trend eect are not driven by patents, we also include a similar
interaction between patent stock and time trend.
Column 1 is our baseline specication without trend interaction. The elasticity of market value
11Since both types of shifts may have occurred, we are technically estimating the net quantitative impact of these
shifts. That is, whether cost increases are quantitatively more important than a decline in private benets in leading
to the reduction in the annual number of publications.
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with respect to publication stock is 0.08 and statistically dierent from zero. Evaluated at the sample
average, this elasticity implies that the market value of a publication is $1.1 million (0:08 2075149 ).
Column 2 adds the time trend interacted with publication and patent stocks. The coecient
estimate on the trend interaction with publication stock is negative and statistically dierent from
zero. The estimate indicates that elasticity of market value with respect to publication stock fell
by about 20 percent per decade (0:02=0:11), or by close to 50 percent over the estimation period.
By contrast, the elasticity of market value with respect to patent stock shows no downward trend.
Column 3 includes only publishing rms, and column 4 includes only rms with established
research programs (i.e., rms with at least one publication during the early sample period 1980-
1985). In line with our previous results (Table 3), the decline is more marked for this type of rms.
The coecient estimates imply that the elasticity of publication stock fell by 50 percent per decade
(0:03=0:06) for all publishing rms and by 67 percent (0:04=0:06) for rms with established research
programs. Based on the estimates from column 4 and evaluated at the sample mean, the stock
market value associated with one publication by a rm with an established research program is
$900 thousand (0:06 4224286 ) in the rst decade of our sample (1980-1990).12 By the end of second
decade of our sample, this value drops by 67 percent to $295 thousand (0:02 4224286 ). Thus, on average
each publications adds about $60 thousand less to rm value than it did the year before. The time
trend estimates also imply a reduction in the value of scientic capability (holding publication stock
constant) of $171 million between the rst and second decade of our sample ((0:9   0:3)  286)).
This decline appears reasonable in magnitude and substantial. In addition, these rms publish 25
percent fewer publications per decade (column 4 in Table 3). Evaluated at the sample average of
190 publications per decade, there are fewer 48 publications per rm-decade. Assigning a shadow
price of $900 ($295) thousand per publication, this implies that the value attributable to scientic
capability declined by $214 ($185) million per decade.13
Furthermore, the average stock market value of a rm with an established research program
is $4.2 billion with asset stock of $2.5 billion. Thus, the intangible stock of those rms is $1.7
billion. This suggests that, over the estimation period (2.6 decades), the market value attributable
to scientic knowledge stock declined by between 28 to 32 percent of the market value of their
intangible assets (214 2:6=1700, or 185 2:6=1700).
12The average stock market value and publication stock for rms with mature research programs are $4,224 million
and 286, respectively. The implied value of one publication is the estimated elasticity multiplied by the ratio of market
value to the total stock of publications i.e., 0:06 4224
286
:
13A reduction in research is a sensible response to a reduction in its value. The part of the value of the rm that
will be attributable to scientic capability will naturally fall as well.
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Columns 5 and 6 distinguish between high and low quality publications using the journal impact
factor. Also in line with the results in Table 3, the estimates in columns 5 and 6 suggest that the
decline in the elasticity of stock market value with respect to publication stock is driven by high
quality publications. Column 5 includes separate stock variables for publications in high impact
factor journals and for publications in low impact factor journals (classied based on top and bottom
quartiles, respectively, as in Table 3). The estimates for high impact factor publications indicate
that the elasticity estimate fell from 0.24 in 1980 (statistically dierent from zero) to zero in 2006.
To summarize, Table 4 suggests that, in withdrawing from science, large rms have been fol-
lowing market signals. The value of scientic capability, as measured by the correlation between
stock market value and publication stock, has declined; moreover, this decline appears to be driven
by high-impact research. Finally, based on our theoretical model, we conclude that the eects of
a decrease in the private benets of internal research are likely to have dominated the eects of a
possible increase in the costs of research.
[Insert Table 4 here]
4.1.3 Variation across industries
Tables 5a and 5b examine how our main results vary across industries. We classify rms into
industries based on their four-digit SIC level. The industries we consider are: drugs, chemicals,
energy, telecommunications, machinery, electronics and energy.14
Table 5a examines how the number of publications varies over time in dierent industries, and
Table 5b examines how the stock market value of publication stock also varies over time in these
industries. Overall, we nd that the trends reported in Tables 3 and 4 are present in most industries.
In Table 5a, we estimate within-rm specications for number of publications and allow the time-
trend to dier across industries. Column 1 shows that publications fell in most industries except for
drugs and energy, where the trend estimates are positive and statistically dierent from zero (e.g.,
for drugs:  0.13 + 0.36 = 0.23). Column 2 includes only rms with at least one publication during
the early sample period 1980-1985 and yields similar patterns.
Columns 3-4 estimate the specication from column 1 for publications in high impact factor
journals (column 3) and low impact factor journals (column 4). We nd that, in high impact factor
journals, the decline in number of publications is evident in all industries, including drugs and
energy. In low impact factor journals (column 4), there is no change in publications over time in
14Table A4 in the online appendix includes a list of all SIC codes that fall in each category.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
most industries, and there is actually an increase in drugs and energy.
Table 5b examines the relationship between scientic capability (measured by the stock of pub-
lications) and market value, over time in various industries. As in Table 4, it shows that the implied
private value of scientic capability decreased in all industries except for drugs where the coecient
is insignicant. The principal conclusion from Tables 5a and 5b is that the decline in high impact
research that we have documented is broad based and not driven by any particular industry.
[Insert Tables 5a and 5b here]
4.1.4 Value of scientic output in M&A
Our estimates of the private value of scientic capability rely upon stock market values. These
reect the collective judgment of investors. The price that rms pay to acquire other rms, and the
part of the price attributable to the publication stock of the target, provide instead an estimate of
the implied value that managers put on scientic capability. Using acquisition price to estimate the
private value of scientic capability serves a second purpose as well. If the decline in publications
merely reected changes in the publication practices of the sample rms, but scientic capability
remained valuable, one would not expect a large change in the value of the scientic capability of
target rms. The acquisition price attributable to the publication stock of the target rm should
remain stable, if even the acquiring rm did not intend to continue publishing in the future.
For this analysis, we use the set of acquisitions by our sample rms where data on acquisition
price, percentage of acquired equity, value of assets, and annual sales is available in SDC Platinum.
We further restrict the sample to targets from OECD countries. We match the acquired rms
(targets) to ISI and PatStat to develop measures of the publication and patents of the target rms.
Our sample includes 26,884 acquisitions by Compustat rms. Nearly half (46%) of the deals involve
American targets, 19 percent involve British targets, and 6 percent involve Japanese targets. At
the time of their acquisition, 836 target rms have at least one scientic publication and 4,852 rms
have at least one patent.
Table A5 in the online appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics for target rms. Target
rms have a mean valuation of $155 million, $75 million in mean assets, and $133 million in annual
sales. Of the target rms that have at least one publication over the whole 1985{2007 sample period,
the mean stock of publications at the time of the acquisition is 3 with a median value of 0.6. Of
the target rms with at least one patent, the mean stock of patents (the sum of USPTO and EPO
patents) at the time of the acquisition is 31 with a median value of 4.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
Table 6 presents the estimation results for acquisition price as a function of stock of publications
of the target. The estimation results are consistent with the stock market value regressions and show
that the implied value of scientic capability has indeed fallen. Column 1 interacts publication and
patent stocks with time trend. Consistent with our previous ndings, the elasticity of acquisition
price with respect to publication stock fell over time. On the other hand, the elasticity of acquisition
price with respect to patent stock rose.
Columns 2{3 use more exible specications, which split the sample at the median year value.
As before, the coecient estimate on publication stock is very large and statistically signicant in
the early sample period (0.17) and falls nearly to zero in the later sample period (-0.04). We easily
reject the null hypothesis that these two coecients are statistically identical. Interestingly, there
is no change in the implied value of tangible assets or patent stocks. Column 4 shows that the same
pattern of results continues to hold when we restrict the sample to target rms that either patent at
the USPTO or EPO or publish. Column 5 shows that the results are not driven by the 1999{2001
IT bubble.
The results in Table 6 indicate that the value acquiring rms place on the scientic capability
of their targets (as proxied by publication stock) has fallen over time whereas the value they place
on the technical capability of their targets (as proxied by patent stock) has not decreased. This
is consistent with the idea that large rms are shifting their focus away from research and toward
more applied activities. That is, acquiring rms appear to increasingly focus on commercializing
the (patented) technologies of their targets, rather than carrying out further scientic research
post-acquisition.
[Insert Table 6 here]
4.1.5 Post-acquisition publication behavior
If the value of scientic capabilities has declined and acquiring rms are becoming more reluctant
to invest in science, we would expect to see a decline in publication activity by researchers of the
target rms after the acquisition. Measuring post-acquisition publication activity is challenging
because the acquired rm may cease to exist as an independent unit following the acquisition. To
account for publications of potentially dissolved units, we include publications by acquiring rms in
the post-acquisition period where the authors also appear on pre-acquisition publications belonging
to the acquired rm.15 If large rms are withdrawing from science, then the scientists who are hired
15We use a three-year window to track publications after acquisition by the target rm. Around 90 percent of the
publications continue to carry the name of the acquired rm, but about 10 percent of the post-acquisition publications
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through acquisitions should reduce their publication activity post-acquisition, and the reduction
should be larger for more recent acquisitions.
Table 7 presents the estimation results of a within-rm variation in publication behavior post-
acquisition. For each rm, we examine a three-year window around the acquisition year and estimate
the eect of a post-acquisition dummy|a dummy that receives the value of one for the three post-
acquisition years and zero for three pre-acquisition years. Columns 1{3 present the estimation
results for the number of publications. Column 1 shows that publications tend to drop after the
rm is acquired. Comparing columns 2 and 3, we see that the drop is concentrated in acquisitions
in the second half of our sample period: the coecient on the post-acquisition dummy fell from
0.01 for acquisitions between 1985 and 1996, to -0.20 for acquisitions between 1997 and 2004. The
dierence is statistically signicant and meaningful. Whereas there was no decline in publication
post-acquisition in the early part of the sample period, for later deals, after-acquisition publications
dropped by about 33 percent of the sample mean. In unreported regressions, we conrm that
the decline is more marked when publications are weighted by citations, where the citations are
normalized by the mean citation for all publications in the same cohort.
We repeat this exercise, this time with patents. We check whether inventors from acquired
rms also reduced patenting after acquisition. As we can see in columns 4-6, on average, patenting
activity rose after the rm was acquired, although this rise took place mostly in the rst half of the
sample, while in the second half there was no change in patenting activity post-acquisition.
In sum, Table 7 provides additional support for the conjecture that large rms are withdrawing
from engaging in scientic research internally. The rms they acquire have reduced their propensity
to publish post-acquisitions, and this is true especially for acquisitions in the second half of our
sample period.
[Insert Table 7 here]
4.2 The use of science in invention
Firms may reduce their engagement in science if scientic knowledge is becoming less relevant to
commercial innovation. Tracing the application of science to commercial ends is very dicult. One
proxy, admittedly highly imperfect, is the citations patents make to scientic publications (Narin
et al., 1997). If corporate inventions are less likely to be science-based, there ought to be fewer
citations to science by patents.
are in the name of the acquiring rm but with an author who appears on a previous publication of the target rm.
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Table 8 examines trends in the citations to scientic publications by patents produced by our
sample rms. We start with the \non-patent literature" (NPL) referenced in patents. Because we
are interested in patent citations to science, we purged the NPL of references to trade journals,
product manuals, and the like, and retained only publications in \hard science" journals. As shown
in column 1, patent citations to science as a share of all citations (patent and NPL) increased over
time (within-rm estimation with controls for lagged R&D stock and sales). Columns 2 and 3
split the sample into rms that publish and rms that do not. We nd a positive trend eect for
publishing rms and no eect for non-publishing rms. This suggests that, over time, absorptive
capacity (as measured by publication activity) may have become more important to absorb and use
existing scientic knowledge, the vast bulk of which is external to the rm.
Our ndings are consistent with NSF data. NSF data show that whereas about 10.6 percent of
U.S. utility patents cited scientic publications in 1998, the share had increased to 12 percent by
2008 (NSF S&E Indicators, 2012, Table 5-49). More recent NSF data, using a dierent bibliometric
database, show that in 2014, nearly 25 percent of patents cited scientic publications (NSF S&E
Indicators, 2016, Table 5-64). Note that this evidence refers to the use in patents of all published
science (regardless of who sponsored it). Whether corporate science is becoming less useful to the
corporations that sponsored it remains a topic for future research.
Though patents may continue to cite science, they may be citing older science. If innovation is
less likely to require new scientic knowledge, rms may reduce their own investment in creating
such new knowledge. Columns 4{5 present within-rm estimation results for specications where
the dependent variable is the natural log of the average publication age of cited articles for all
patents of the focal rm in a given year. The age of cited publications is the dierence between
a patent grant year and the cited publication year. Average publication age of cited articles is
computed for rm-year observations with at least one patent citation to science. The estimate
of time trend is insignicant indicating that the age of science used in innovation has remained
unchanged over time. Figure 3 plots the average publication age of cited articles. Results support
the ndings from column 4: the age of science used in innovation has remained unchanged with
a mean age of approximately 10 years. Column 5 adds interactions between trend and industry
dummies to explore cross-industry variation. Cited publication age remains stable over time except
for drugs, where rms tend to cite somewhat older publications over time, perhaps reecting the
large investments in medical research in the United States since the early 1990s.
To sum up, we nd no evidence that corporate inventions have become less science-intensive or
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that the relevant scientic knowledge is of older vintage.
[Insert Table 8 and Figure 3 here]
5 Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a set of \stylized facts" that practitioners and
researchers can use to inform future debates. Using data on all publicly traded American rms
for over a quarter century, we nd that publications by company scientists have declined between
1980 and 2007 in a broad range of industries. This is particularly true for publications that can
be classied as \basic" or \inuential". In stock market value regressions, we also nd that the
value attributable to scientic research has dropped, whereas the value attributable to technical
knowledge (as measured by patents) has remained stable. We additionally analyze acquisitions of
small, research-based rms to infer the implied value managers place on scientic capability in target
rms, and examine the publication behavior of target-rm scientists following the acquisition.
Interpreted in conjunction with related evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, on the
changing structure of corporate R&D (e.g., Tijssen, 2004; Mowery, 2009; Bhaskarbhatla and Hegde,
2013), our ndings indicate that large rms are withdrawing from internally engaging in science.
The implications are potentially far-reaching. Previous research has documented the importance
of scientic research to corporate value. In a classic paper, Griliches (1986) nds that rms that
spent a larger fraction of their R&D budgets on basic research were more productive in the 1970s.
He estimates a very large rm-level premium on basic research relative to total R&D, on the order
of 3 to 1. Other scholars also highlight the importance for pharmaceutical rms to engage with
the larger scientic community (Gambardella, 1992, 1995; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994, 1996;
Cockburn and Henderson, 1998). They nd that a bundle of organizational practices and rm
characteristics|the propensity to promote scientic personnel on the basis of their standing in the
scientic community, the proximity to research universities, rms' involvement in joint research
projects and investment in information sources|was signicantly related to success in drug discov-
ery in the 1980s. Cohen et al. (2002) nd that rms that engage with universities through a variety
of channels, including conferences and meetings and informal exchanges, gain through new R&D
projects as well as completion of existing projects.
Our results qualify these important early ndings. While we do nd a positive association
between scientic capability as measured by publication stock and rm value at the beginning of
our sample period, this association largely disappears after the 1980s. To the best of our knowledge,
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no previous work has examined how the value of scientic capabilities has changed over time. Our
results help make sense of observations such as the demise of the large industrial lab (Coombs
and Georghiou, 2002) or the decline in rm publications (Tijssen, 2004; Bhaskarbhatla and Hegde,
2013). Further, our results suggest that, in implementing these policies, managers were correctly
interpreting market signals. Indeed, another distinguishing feature of our work is that we jointly
analyzed changes in both the value and the quantum of scientic outputs. By piecing together
many complementary pieces of evidence, this paper provides the most comprehensive evidence to
date on the changing structure of corporate R&D in large rms.
To understand what forces drive the decline of large internal research eorts, we classify potential
reasons into three broad categories: (i) a decline in the private value from internal research, (ii) an
increase in the cost of research, and (iii) changes in publication practices. The rst two categories
encompass a variety of institutional, technological, and economic forces that may have induced large
rms to reduce their investments in science. The third category, changes in publication practices,
suggests that the decline in publication output may reect not changes in the composition of large
rms' R&D eorts, but rather a rejection of \open science" in favor of greater secrecy.
We argue that changes in publication practices are unlikely to be the whole story for the decline
in corporate publishing. Were it so, rms would disproportionately reduce publications that are
close to the applied-science end of the spectrum, since these publications may contain commercially
relevant and potentially sensitive information. We nd instead that the decline in rm publications
is most prominent for publications in high impact scientic journals, which arguably contain mostly
basic rather than applied research.16 Furthermore, if changes in publication practices were simply
due to changes in disclosure strategy but rms continued to value scientic capability to the same
extent, we would not expect to nd a signicant reduction in the premium rms pay to acquire
scientic capability through M&A. Instead, we nd that the premium for the scientic capability of
rms acquired in M&A has declined substantially. Finally, aggregate NSF data clearly show that
the share of basic and applied research in total business R&D expenditure has steadily declined
as well, that business share of aggregate research has steadily fallen since the mid 1990s, and in
absolute levels, business research has grown slowly in constant terms.17 This suggests that the
decline in publications and the increase in patenting at the rm level are not merely driven by a
change in publication strategy. Rather, large rms appear to be moving away from research and
16On the other hand, publications close to the applied-science end of the spectrum may be less at risk of exposing
valuable knowledge if this knowledge has also been incorporated into patent applications.
17See Tables 4-3 to 4-8, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2016.
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toward development.
As mentioned above, large rms may be reducing their investments in internal science because
the associated benets are lower or the costs are higher. We develop a simple model that shows that
these two sets of factors have similar eects on scientic output but opposite eects on the value of
existing scientic capability. A decrease in benets tends to reduce the value of existing scientic
capability, while an increase in costs tends to increase its value. Indeed, the more expensive it is to
create new knowledge, the more valuable it should be to already have a (opportunely discounted)
knowledge stock in-house. In the empirical analysis, we document both a decline in the number
of publications over time and a drop in the value of existing scientic capability. We conclude,
tentatively at least, that the eect of a decrease in the private benets of internal research dominates
that of an increase in cost.
Among the mechanisms that may have aected the benets of scientic research, we nd little
support for the idea that inventions have become less science-based, as measured by the citations
patents make to scientic publications. We show that corporate inventions continue to draw upon
science and that the vintage of scientic knowledge used in invention has not changed over time.18
We also nd that engagement in science is becoming increasingly important to absorb and use
existing scientic knowledge. It may well be that large rms are moving to a bare minimum of
internal research expenditures that allow them to tap into externally generated knowledge. This is
a delicate balancing act and very deep cuts in internal research may erode this capability irreversibly.
The paper highlights several promising areas for further research. Our framework suggests that
the growth of technology markets, growing global competition and appropriability problems, and
increasing short-termism are possible underlying causes of large rms' withdrawal from science. The
relationship among these factors themselves is likely to be quite complex, as well as their relationship
to corporate investment in science. For instance, globalization may induce multi-product rms to
shed peripheral businesses, and more focused rms may then reduce their investments in science
(Liu and Rosell, 2013). Competitive pressures may push rms to seek outside technologies, boosting
technology markets but perhaps reducing the incentives for internal research.
Our emphasis on technology markets should also make clear that what we observe is a decline
in large rms' engagement in in-house scientic research. Indeed, it is perfectly possible that
large rms may be investing in science through other means; for instance, by funding scientists in
18We stress that what remains important for invention is the collective body of scientic knowledge that is produced
over time. What is relevant for rms' investment decisions is the eect of their own research and publications on their
own performance. In this paper we do not examine how the frequency of rms' patent citations to own science has
changed over time, but this is an important direction for future work.
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universities or smaller ventures that are scientically very active.19 A fuller account of all the ways
in which large rms can invest, directly or indirectly, in science would be highly desirable.
Whether it is in the rms' long-run interest to reduce their investments in science is a dicult
question. Markets appear to value such investments less, perhaps with good reason. Long-term
investments in science may be less desirable with the growing availability of external inventions, or
when competitive threats loom larger. A somewhat dierent view holds that, whereas in the past
large American and European rms could aord to invest in long-term, speculative research, this
is not possible because of impatient investors with short attention spans. Whether the pressures to
meet investors' quarterly expectations are compromising valuable capabilities, or instead markets
are pushing large corporations to eciently outsource research to smaller, nimbler rms, is an
important question that deserves further attention.
6 Concluding remarks
Our results indicate that the willingness of large rms to engage in internal scientic research has
declined. This is reected in their behavior (e.g., their propensity to publish), the acquisition price
of the science-intensive rms they acquire, and the stock market premium that investors attach to
scientic capability of the rms. It is also consistent with other evidence reported in the literature
on the increase in alliances and licensing, as well as qualitative evidence on the decline in corporate
research.
The paper has implications for how rms should manage their innovation activities, and raises
some potential concerns about the future of U.S. innovation.
The implications for rms revolve around two fundamental questions in strategy|how rms can
balance the tradeo between current protability and growth, and how they can access innovations
cost-eectively. Our paper suggest that, because large rms are investing less in in-house research,
they will have to rely more on inventions acquired from outside to fuel their growth. Indeed, Arora
et al. (2016) document that nearly 50% of product innovations introduced by U.S. manufacturing
rms relied upon external inventions. Though universities, start-ups and other technology specialists
collectively supply only 17% of the total inventions, these are the highest value inventions. Clearly
in an environment where external sources of innovation are more important, absorptive capacity
and collaborative and integrative skills will also become more important, relative to the situation
19Our analysis does examine, however, the possibility that scientic capabilities may be acquired externally through
mergers and acquisitions.
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when innovations largely arise from inside the rm (Burgelman and McKinney, 2006; Valentini,
2012).
A more extensive division of innovative labor will also create opportunities as well as challenges
for scientic entrepreneurs. A key challenge is how to monetize scientic capability. If acquirers
will not pay for scientic research, as our results indicate, start-ups will have to invest longer, until
such time as the research bears fruit and the resulting innovations can be converted into patents
and products. This will increase their costs and exposure to risk. Moreover, not all start-ups that
are good at research are also good at converting their research into commercially relevant forms.
Requiring all research-intensive start-ups to move downstream may dissuade some start-ups from
investing in research, reducing the overall investment into an activity that is believed to have high
social returns.
Our results may also raise some concerns about the future of U.S. innovation. The U.S. scientic-
industrial complex has been a tremendous source of scientic and economic progress in the 20th
century. The fact that one of its key components|the large corporate lab|is in decline can be
seen as a reason for concern.
For a decline in internal scientic research by large rms not to adversely aect U.S. innova-
tion and long-term prosperity, this decline must be compensated through other sources. The most
obvious sources of new scientic knowledge, besides the large corporate labs, are universities and
science-intensive start-ups. These institutions may in part be nanced by large rms themselves,
through licensing and contracts (Arora et al., 2001), corporate venture capital investments (Dush-
nitsky and Lenox, 2005), or outright acquisitions.20 Incorporating all these players into the analysis,
as well as expanding its geographical scope to account for emerging economies such as China and
India, are clearly priorities in future work.
But even assuming that research is being relocated from large labs to nimbler, more ecient
organizations, reasons for concern may still remain. First, research conducted by universities and
small rms may be an imperfect substitute for research conducted by larger rms. Commercializa-
tion of university research is subject to `frictions', such as geographical isolation from the relevant
industry actors (Belenzon and Schankerman, 2013; Bikard and Marx, 2015), that may hinder or
delay technology transfer. Small rms' research may also qualitatively dier from large rms' re-
search because small rms may lack the resources necessary to carry out certain types of projects,
or may face stronger pressures to deliver results quickly (Tether, 1998; Kapoor, 2013). For instance,
20Arora et al. (2016) nd that a third of all externally sourced inventions are sourced through licensing, contracts,
and outright acquisitions.
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some projects require the integration of multiple knowledge streams and commercial capabilities
that may only be available in large rms. Thus, small rms may be good at producing some types
of innovations, but not at others (Pisano, 2010).
The best innovation ecosystems may also be those that emerge when large and small rms
interact. Agrawal et al. (2014) nd a large innovation premium in regions where numerous small
labs coexist with at least one large lab, compared to regions of a similar size without many small
labs or a large lab. One important reason appears to be the spin-o activity of large labs, suggesting
the presence of signicant positive externalities generated by large rms' research activities. The
demise of the large corporate labs may compromise the vitality of many regional ecosystems.
Finally, as mentioned above, our results suggest that exit through acquisition is becoming a
longer and more dicult process for scientic start-ups. This may dissuade some of them from
entering their industries in the rst place, reducing the overall investment in research and the
innovation potential of the economy.
To conclude, innovation is a key source of modern economic growth. Over the last century,
large, vertically-integrated rms have been the locus of much scientic and technological progress.
However, although the literature has extensively documented how innovation has become more
open, the associated shift away from internal research and toward development in large rms has
largely been neglected. By documenting this under-studied but important trend, we contribute to
the debate on how industrial innovation is changing and the implications for strategic management
and policy. We hope future research will explore the underlying drivers of the trends we document,
as well as their normative implications.
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e Table 1. Factors that may have affected the propensity of large firms to publish
Theoretical focus Reasons for change
How factors have affected: 
• Quantity of publications 
• Value of existing publication stock
Firms may publish less because they 
have reduced their investments in 
internal scientific research
A. Changes in the private benefits
of internal research
• Science has become less useful to innovation
Quantity:    –
Value:          –
• Growth of technology markets
• Growing appropriability problems: increased 
competition
• Growing appropriability problems: narrower firm scope
• Short-termism
B. Changes in the private costs of 
internal research
• Rising wage costs for scientists, more expensive 
equipment
Quantity:    –
Value:          +
• Decline in the scientific productivity of internal research
Firms are increasingly reluctant to
disclose their scientific results to the
broader scientific community
C. Changes in publication 
practices
• Stronger protection of IP rights  has shifted firms’ focus 
on patenting, to the detriment of publishing Quantity:    –
Value:          ?
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Variables No. Obs. No. Firms Mean Std. Dev. 10th 50th 90th
Market value  ($, mm) 62,474 4,608 2,075 7,488 5 106 3,438
Assets  ($, mm) 62,474 4,608 1,212 4,200 1.44 38 2,142
Sales  ($, mm) 62,474 4,608 1,731 5,799 2 82 3,373
R&D expenditures  ($, mm) 62,474 4,608 69 256 0 5 103
Publication stock 36,999 2,535 149 1,037 0 1 112
Number of publications 36,999 2,535 13 73 0 0 14
Patent stock 62,474 4,608 188 1,291 0 5 175
Number of patents 62,474 4,608 19 120 0 0 24
Table 2. Summary statistics for main variables
Distribution
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the estimation for our sample of Compustat
firms. Publication and patent variables are weighted by citations. Weights are the ratio between the number of citations
received and the average number of citations received by publications (patents) published (granted) in the same year as the
focal publication (patent). Publications are reported for firms with at least one publication during our sample period.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample:
Variables All firms
At least 
one pub
Firm fixed 
effects
Established 
research firms
Bottom 
quartile Top quartile
Established 
research 
firms, top 
quartile
Bottom 
quartile Top quartile
Established 
research firms, 
top quartile of 
citations
Time trend (per decade) -0.20 -0.38 -0.20 -0.25 -0.02 -0.32 -0.35 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(R&D expenditures )t-1 0.42 0.49 0.23 0.24 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Sales )t-1 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.17
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes - - - - - - - -
Mean publications per year 7 15 15 19 7 6 8 2 17 22
R2 0.53 0.6 0.87 0.89 0.70 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.79 0.82
Observations 55,751 25,992 25,992 16,320 25,992 25,992 16,320 25,992 25,992 16,320
Table 3. Trend in number of publications, 1980–2006
Journal impact factor Scientific citations received
Notes: This table presents within-firm estimation results for number of publications by publicly listed R&D-performing American firms for the period 
1980–2006.  Columns 4, 7 and 10 include firms with at least one publication during the early sample period of 1980-1985. Columns 5-10 distinguish between 
high quality and low quality scientific publications as indicated by the impact factor of the journal where they are published and the number of citations they 
receive from other publications (normalized by average number of citations received by all publications published in the same year). Top and bottom quartile 
values are from all Web of Science publications. Trend is divided by 10 (i.e., presented in decennial units). Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity through clustering by firms.
All journals
Dependent variable: ln(Number of publications ) 
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Variables Baseline
Trend 
interactions
At least 
one pub
Established 
research 
firms All
Established 
research 
firms
Time trend × ln (Publication stock )t-1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time trend × ln(Top quartile publication 
stock )t-1 -0.09 -0.09
(0.01) (0.02)
Time trend × ln(Bottom quartile 
publication stock )t-1 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.02)
Time trend × ln(Patent stock )t-1 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
ln(Publication stock) t-1 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Top quartile publication stock)t-1 0.24 0.14
(0.02) (0.05)
ln(Bottom quartile publication stock)t-1 -0.05 -0.09
(0.02) (0.04)
ln(1+Patent stock )t-1 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
ln(R&D stock )t-1 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
ln(Sales )t-1 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.26 0.10 0.26
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05)
ln(Assets )t-1 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.24
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Time trend 0.71 0.96 0.87 0.70 0.83
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes No No No No No
R2 0.83 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.82 0.87
Observations 42,448 42,448 21,237 12,779 42,448 12,779
Table 4. Trends in the stock market value of publications, 1980–2006
Notes: This table examines the relationship between the stock market value of a firm and its publication and patent stocks. 
Column 4 includes firms with at least one publication during the early sample period of 1980-1985. Columns 5-6 
distinguish between high quality and low quality scientific publications as indicated by the impact factor of the journal 
where they are published. Top and bottom quartile values are from all Web of Science publications. Trend is divided by 
10 (i.e., presented in decennial units). Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity through 
clustering by firms.
Dependent variable: ln(Market value )
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Variables All journals
Established research 
firms
Top quartile journal 
impact factor
Bottom quartile 
journal impact 
factor
Time trend -0.13 -0.14 -0.17 -0.003
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Time trend  ×:
Dummy for Drugs 0.36 0.34 -0.11 0.40
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Dummy for Chemicals 0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Dummy for Telecommunications 0.09 -0.07 -0.11 0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Dummy for Machinery 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Dummy for Electronics 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Dummy for Energy 0.17 -0.15 -0.15 0.12
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07)
ln(R&D expenditures )t-1 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(Sales )t-1 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.86 0.88 0.76 0.70
Observations 33,287 21,921 33,287 33,287
Table 5a. Trend in number of publications by industry 
Notes:  This table examines time trends in number of publications across industries. Industry classification is based on four-
digit main SIC codes. Column 1 includes firms with positive publication stock. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to 
highest and lowest quartile of journal impact factor value, respectively. Trend is divided by 10 (i.e., presented in decade 
units). Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity through clustering by firms.
Dependent variable: ln(Number of publications ) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Drugs Chemicals
Telecomm-
unications Machinery Electronics Energy
Time trend × ln(Publication stock )t-1 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Time trend × ln(Patent stock )t-1 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
ln(Publication stock )t-1 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
ln(Patent stock )t-1 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.05 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Time trend 0.13 0.24 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.30
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
ln(Assets )t-1 0.45 0.44 0.35 0.43 0.40 0.32
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
ln(R&D stock )t-1 0.32 0.03 0.20 0.18 0.23 -0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
ln(Sales )t-1 0.13 0.26 0.26 0.18 0.22 0.34
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
R2 0.77 0.84 0.65 0.78 0.75 0.83
Observations 6,114 2,784 8,497 13,081 10,296 1,454
Table 5b. Trends in the stock market value of publications by industry
Notes:  This table examines time trends in the stock market value of publications across industries. Industry classification is 
based on four-digit main SIC codes. Publications and patents are weighted by citations. Trend is measured in decade units. 
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity through clustering by firms.
Dependent variable: ln(Market value )
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All years
1985– 
1997
1998– 
2007
Innovating 
targets
Excluding 
IT bubble
Time trend × ln(Publication stock )t-
1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time trend × ln(Patent stock )t-1 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(1+Publication stock )t-1 0.29 0.17 -0.04 0.27 0.31
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
p-value  for difference in estimates:
ln(1+Patent stock )t-1 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
ln(Assets ) 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.65 0.60
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
ln(Sales ) 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.17
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Time trend 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.003) (0.01) (0.003)
Two-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country target dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquisition year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.65 0.68 0.63 0.65 0.66
Observations 26,884 14,990 11,894 4,684 25,004
Notes:  This table examines the relationship between target's firm value and its publication and 
patent stocks. The sample includes all SDC Platinum deals with non-missing information on 
target firm value, assets, and sales. The sample period is 1985–2007. Column 4 includes only 
target firms with at least one patent or scientific publication. Column 5 excludes acquisitions 
made during the 1999-2001 IT bubble period. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity through clustering by firms.
Table 6. Value of publication stock of acquired firms
Dependent variable: ln(Target's firm value )
p-value <0.01
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Dependent variable:
Acquisition year: All
1985– 
1996
1997– 
2004 All 1985–1996 1997–2004
Post-acquisition dummy -0.08 0.01 -0.20 1.17 2.04 0.18
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.47) (0.63) (0.70)
p-value  for difference in estimates:
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean publications/patents 0.57 0.57 0.58 8.6 6.6 10.3
R2 0.87 0.90 0.82 0.95 0.91 0.97
Observations 19,475 10,615 8,860 22,369 11,040 11,329
p-value <0.01 p-value <0.01
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions that examine publishing and patenting activity before and 
after being acquired. Post-acquisition dummy receives the value of one for observations where the year is later 
than the acquisition value and zero otherwise. We include observations in a three-year window from the 
acquisition year. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity through clustering by 
firms.
Table 7. Publications and patents by target firms in three-year window around 
acquisition year
ln(Number of publications ) ln(Number of patents )
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Dependent variable:
Variables All firms
 Publishing 
firms
 Non-
publishing 
firms
Positive 
NPL
Positive 
NPL
Time trend 0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.12
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.13) (0.22)
Time trend  ×:
Dummy for Drugs 0.88
(0.31)
Dummy for Chemicals -0.07
(0.38)
Dummy for Telecommunications -0.61
(0.37)
Dummy for Machinery -0.22
(0.28)
Dummy for Electronics -0.56
(0.26)
Dummy for Energy -0.34
(0.48)
ln(R&D stock )t-1 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(Sales )t-1 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.02 0.02
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(NPL cites ) 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.51 0.51 0.36 0.43 0.43
Observations 55,751 33,287 22,464 18,333 18,333
Table 8. Use of science in invention: citations by patents to scientific 
publications
Notes:  This table examines time trends in citations to scientific articles by patents for our 
Compustat sample of R&D-performing firms for the period 1980–2006. Share of NPL 
citations (Columns 1-3) is the ratio between patent citations to scientific journals and the total 
number of citations the patent makes (NPL and non-NPL). Columns 4-5 examine the trend in 
average age of cited articles for the subsample of firms with patents that cite scientific articles. 
Age is the difference between the grant year of the citing patent and the publication year of the 
cited article. Trend is divided by 10 (i.e., presented in decennial units). Standard errors (in 
brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity through clustering by firms.
Share of NPL citations
ln(Age of cited 
publications )
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Figure 2: Trends in publishing by 
selected industries, 1980-2006
Note: This figure presents average firm-year publications over time by
firms in selected industries. Industry classification is based on SIC
codes. Annual publication is conditional on at least one publication.
Figure 1: Publishing, patenting, and 
research: U.S. firms, 1980-2006
Annual publication
Annual patent 
R&D intensity (right axis)
Annual publication
R&D intensity
Annual patent 
Note: This figure presents average firm-year publications and
patents over time for Compustat firms with at least one year of
positive R&D expenditures and at least one patent. R&D intensity is
R&D expenditures over sales. Annual publication is conditional on
at least one publication.
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eFigure 3: Use of science in innovation: 
average age of science cited in patents 
and average cites per patent, 1980-2006 
Note: This figure presents average publication age of cited articles by patents (NPL)
and share of citations to science per firm-year for our sample firms. Cited publication
age is the difference between patent grant year and year of publication of the cited
article. Scientific citation share is the ratio between patent citations to leading
scientific journals and the total number of references the patent makes.
Cited publication age (left axis)
Citations to scientific literature as 
fraction of all citations
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